The Military Sealift Command: Their Potential Role in Providing Military Logistic Support to the Persian Gulf by Nicholas, Kevin W.
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs
4-2-1987
The Military Sealift Command: Their Potential
Role in Providing Military Logistic Support to the
Persian Gulf
Kevin W. Nicholas
University of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences
and Meteorology Commons
This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas, Kevin W., "The Military Sealift Command: Their Potential Role in Providing Military Logistic Support to the Persian Gulf "
(1987). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 377.
'IBE MILITARY SEALIFr <XJIomND
'!heir Potential Role in Providing Military Logistic
SlJWOrt to the Persian Gulf
Kevin W. Nicholas
Major Paper
Marine Affairs seminar
2 April 1987
Bruce E. Marti
Professor, Marine Affairs Department
University of Rhode Island
Major Paper Advisor
i.
Date: _
em:
'IWO
- mrnoOOCI'IOO •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
- SI'RA.'I'EX:'iI C S~In .
l.
6.
mREE - S~~ mE ST.N;E........................................ 11.
- PREPOSITIOOm:; AND 'lEE INITIAL roRGE PHASE ••••••••••••••• 18.
FIVE
SIX
- SHORT AND LONG TERM RESUPPLy..•....•.•.••...........••.•• 30.
- SU~Y AND CX)N~USlOOS •..•.•.•..••.•••.•.••••••.•••••..• 47.
ii.
LIST OF FIGJRES
FIGURE
1 - S'IRA.r.rEX:;IC S~IE--r' CMACI'I'Y••••••••••.••..••.••••••.••••••••
PN;E
7.
2 - STRAr.rEX:;IC AIRLIE--r' CMACITY•••••.••••••.•••••...••...•...•.. 8.
3 - SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14.
4 - INDIAN OCEAA' GEXX3.RAl?fIY..................................... 16 .
5 MPS VESSEL DESIGN FEATURES••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 25.
6 - SIiIP ~Y?-1ENr QiART...................................... 31.
7 - SEA SHED DES IGN. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 34.
8 - E1JA'I'RA.0< DESIGN. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 36 •
9 - SThXiliE ANQiOR LEX; r-xxJRIN; (SALM) DESIGN•••••••••••••••••••• 42.
iii.
Thanks to the staff of the Military Sealift Command Headquarters
in Washington, D.C. and to the staff of the Naval War College Library
for their assistance in helping compile much of the research material
for this paper.
Special thanks to my wife Leslee for her support throughout this
project.
iv.
The ultimate goal of the U.S. Maritime strategy is to project
power into all the oceans of the world. By projecting power over this
vast a geographic area, the u.s. is able to provide a deterrent force
that will inhibit the development of a significant hostile military
action, anywhere in the world. The ability to support this global
peacekeeping force hinges on the caPability of the u.s. to provide a
strong logistic support organization. From a waterborne
perspective, the Indian OCean is the one geographic area of the world
that presents the greatest logistic challenge. The u.s. Navy and the
Military sealift Command combine their resources and efforts to assure
that this objective is achieved.
v.
If there is a geographic area of the earth that can still be
regarded from a naval standpoint as a 'frontier', then that region
would be the Indian OCean. Up until about six years ago, u.s. Navy
units were earning the Navy EXPeditionary Medal for deployments into
this area. Several political and operational factors have now
combined to designate the Indian OCean as a standard naval operating
area with two battle groups normally on station. The Indian Ocean
represents a total of 28 billion square miles, is bounded by 20
separate nations and can be accessed via the Suez Canal/Red Sea, Cape
of Good Hope and Indonesian PaSsages. Probably the most valuable real
estate in this region is the Persian Gulf which encompasses a
tremendous amount of the world's petroleum reserves. From a
political, military and economic standpoint, petroleum is an ideal
motivating force which coUld drive a country to use force to acquire
control. Fran a shipping perspective, this geographic area has only
one choke point access that allows for entrance and departure of
military and commercial vessels. Many of the nations that border the
Gulf are politically unstable and have become targets from both
intracountry factions as well as fran outside nations.
As has been demonstrated in numerous global conflicts and most
recently with the fighting in the Falkland Islands, it is essential
2that a nation be supported by a strong, quick and organized logistic
force to support power projection aWGfj fran the homeland. A U.S. Navy
summary report on lessons learned from the Falkland battles states
~ast quantities of munitions and other consumables are required for
sustained canbat, and this is a major concern for U.S. planners. The
lack of any single item could influence dramatically a conflict's
outcome. While not new, this proposition is receiving special
emphasis within the Navy Department. Increasing the combat
sustainability of fleet and marine units ••• is one lesson that was
relearned and needed." (General Dynamics Corp., 1985). Military
logistics are generally categorized into three different areas:
airlift, sealift and prepositioning. The philosophy of this threefold
approach holds true when u.S. military operational strategies are
addressed. Shipping statistics show that approximately 90-95 percent
of the world's trade is carried by water and this same percentage
applies when logistic support activities are examined in support of
military actions. It is precisely this topic that this paper
addresses. The u.s. has been involved in conflicts both in Europe and
the Pacific, but we have never been involved in a major conflict in
the Indian OCean region. Yet, the potential for such an action to
occur is high at this particular time. Both the sealift and
prepositioning responsibilities previously mentioned have been
delegated to the Military Sealift Command (MSC), under the control of
the U.S. Navy. When examining the statistics afore mentioned, it is
evident that the responsibility given to the MSC represents the
essential element necessary to successfully support operational
3strategies.
In order to consolidate the management responsibility for
coordinating logistics within the Department of Defense, the Pentagon
has established a new unified cormand, the U.S. Transportation Ccmnand
(USTRANSCOM) • This cormand will be fully established by OCtober 1988
and will assume the coordination roles previously separated between
the Military Airlift Command, Joint Military Traffic Management
Command, Military sealift Command and the Joint Deployment Agency.
The task of coordinating both air and sea assets will fall upon one
agency ensuring speed of response and a reduction in interagency
conflicts.
This paper focuses on the potential role that seaborne logistics
could play should a COnflict in the Middle East occur and should the
United states became involved in a conventional interdiction. From a
diffiCUlty standpoint as to accessability and from an analysis of
current political situations, the Persian Gulf has been chosen as the
focal point for this discussion. The two specific considerations that
will be addressed through a review of both current and proposed
logistic assets and philosophies are:
Based on years of technical research and development,
the U.S. has the necessary logistic tools to support
forward operations in the Persian Gulf.
and
In this unique area of the world there are several
external variables present that could undermine our
logistic strategy. Current operational plans have
considered the variables and they will not significantly
effect the accomplishment of our logistic objectives.
4To test the above hypotheses, the following considerations are
addressed throughout the paper: 1) geography/isolation of the region,
2) physical logistic assets available, 3) preplanning/prePOSitioning
philosophy, 4) unique vulnerabilities to be encountered and 5) an
analysis of both initial and short/longterm resupply measures to be
utilized. Evaluation is accomplished by analyzing a hypothetical
situation involving the u.s. in a conflict against Iran to halt the
spread of takeover actions against other friendly Arab nations.
Although this paper does not officially represent the viewpoint of the
Department of Defense, the topic focuses heavily on the predominant
military, vice commercial, position on the subject of logistic
capabilities. The analysis is presented from the viewpoint of those
advisors conducting logistic support and does not focus directly on
military actions unless they could potentially impede upon the flow of
supplies. As it is currently structured, this role is the primary
responsibility of the u.s. Central Command whose operational
priorities are: to ensure continual Western access to Persian Gulf
oil; to deter SOviet aggression and preserve regional stability; and
to reduce Soviet regional influence (U.S. Department of Defense,
1986).
Naval logistic support under the cognizance of the MSC is based on
the foundation principal of 'Strategic Sealift'. This principal was
officially adopted by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1984, and it
now carries equal weight with the other two primary mission objectives
of the u.S. Navy, those being: Sea Control and Power Projection.
Strategic sealift is obtained through the accomplishment of three
5specific concepts: 1) prepositioning, 2) surge and 3) resupply (both
short and long term). The analysis of the potential conflict is
presented from a supply standpoint using this specific division of
concepts. The discussion begins with an analysis of Strategic
Sealift. This is then followed with the specific phases of logistic
employment previously mentioned. Prepositioning and surge, due to
their similar timeframe for utilization, will be addressed
simultaneously in the scenario. Resupply will be handled as a
separate topic from the two previous stages. Finally, the results of
the analysis are addressed in the conclusion.
6QlAPmR 'D«)
S'mA'IB;!C SFALIFT
Strategic Sealift, as it has been adopted, is composed of two
elements: the first being the use of u.S. Government owned vessels,
the second being the support role of both U.S.-flag and Allied
Merchant Marine assets. U.S. Government vessels are geared for an
initialrnovement into a conflict area, while the primary role of other
merchant vessels is to support sustained operations. The
understanding of how critical this concept is toward achieving the
goal of global power projection has gained notoriety only within the
past ten years. As stated by the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
"Once we lose sealift capabilities, all other strategies will fail."
(Matthews, 1986). This statement typifies the current thinking in not
only the Department of the Navy, but in the entire Department of
Defense. The plans to be discussed involve the support of the Marine
Corps, Army and Air Force. strategic Sealift has grown along with the
expansion of the surface naval force and has maintained its growth in
light of the Shrinking U.S.-flag merchant fleet. As shown in Figure
1, the overall plan to fortify strategic sealift capability has been
researched extensively and the proposed plan will will reach its
overall goal about 1990. Each of the elements presented in the graph
is addressed in the subsequent discussion. Along with Strategic
Sealift, an understanding of Strategic Airlift (see Figure 2) is
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9essential to any complete strategy of logistics. Although not the
primary focal point of this paper, there exists a deficiency in
overall planned airlift capability and that fact is considered in the
analysis. The philosophy that has developed is centered around the
fact that the u.s. understands the importance of sealift and is
willing to devote money and research tCMard this objective. At the
same time though, it is understood that the final objectives in this
regard can be accomplished without a total resurgence of the U.S.-flag
Merchant Marine. The rapid growth that the Navy has enjoyed in
comparison to a simultaneous decline of the Merchant Marine fleet is
an indication of this trend.
Current estimates from the Pentagon and the Maritime
Administration (MARAn) cite the need for the addition of a minimum of
20 ships per year into the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine fleet to maintain
current levels and produce some stimulation for the U.S. shipbuilding
industry (Pettavino, 1986). While there exists an increase in the
utilization and creation of merchant marine assets to support
Strategic Sealift, this 20 ship level will not be obtained through the
current plans. Public Law 664 (50/50 Law) mandates that at least 50
percent ot waterborne U.S. Government owned/interest cargo will be
carried on U.S.-flag merchants. Current usage shows that the MSC is
far surpassing this and is moving approximately 95 percent of
goverrnnent cargoes. In addition, the Military Transportation Act of
1904 has mandated that military cargo must be carried entirely on U.S.
flag merchants.
To put into perspective how vital the concept of Strategic Sealift
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is to defense strategy, a qUick look at the dollar commitment is
necessary. The entire MSC budget was 1.87 billion dollars in 1985.
Of this amount, over 1.2 billion was devoted specifically to the
strategic Sealift mission area. This included internal operation
costs, research and development, with the greatest portion of the
money being allocated to time/voyage charters in support of this
objective. A combination of the two legislative acts as well as the
direct chartering of commercial vessels for MSC use is estimated at
approximately $15 billion of business for the u.s. shipping industry.
The current design of the MSC strategy shows that the initial
supply line into any global area will be accomplished by both
government owned and chartered vessels. This includes both the
prepositioning of equipment and supplies as well as the initial input
of supplies into the conflict area. The roles of the U.S.-flag
merchants, the Effective Controlled U.S. Fleet, the National Defense
Reserve Fleet and NATO Allies are geared specifically toward the
objective of resupply and will most likely be utilized in the order
presented.
The elements that have been designated to accomplish Strategic
Sealift and their specific design have been formulated with three
variables in mind: distance, specific tasking and the need for
continued resupply. All variables, as well as the specific hardware
dedicated to the mission, are discussed in the analysis.
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There has been an ever-increasing interest in the Persian Gulf
area, especially over the last six years since the end of the oil
embargoes/shortages. A political/geographic overview of the area
shows that at least eight independent nations border the Gulf. Among
the eight nations, Iran incorporates the largest littoral area. Iran
and Iraq are recognized as the two most unstable nations in the
Persian Gulf region. From an economic and strategic standpoint,
Iran's population size, oil production capacity/reserves and direct
access to the Gulf/Straits of Hormuz make it a more valuable prize
than Iraq. Current projections indicate that Iran holds the upper
hand in the current struggle against Iraq and they also carry the
greatest potential to undermine an overthrow of the Iraqi government.
A recent statement on the subject presented in Navy Times indicates
that "If Iran or Iraq wins the war, the West and the u.s. specifically
will lose •••What is happening in the Gulf today is the greatest threat
anywhere to security and peace. OUt of control it could cause massive
damage to Western interests and uniquely in the world, it could in
short order escalate into a u.s. - Soviet confrontation." (Hunter,
1981). The u.S. has adopted the philosophy of avoiding direct
intervention into the current COnflict, but the recent arms scandal
has publicized that the u.S. has been providing arms to both countries
12
for a number of years. Publicized dealings with Iran have undermined
the U.S. position throughout the Middle East and has weakened its
relations with many pro-Western Arab nations. This practice of
feeding arms to both sides and a continued interest in governmental
relations with Iran and Iraq is occurring fran the Soviet Union at the
same time.
Nations throughout the Middle East have developed a simultaneous
sensitivity to the position of both parties. A recent article quoted
a Kuwaiti official's position on the subject of the U.s. protection of
his nations vessels as "It (Kuwait) is reluctant to do so unless
protection can be shared with the Soviet Union, in part because it
does not want to appear to be moving toward either superpower."
(Sciolino, 1987). U.s. Foreign Policy understands how the outcome of
the current struggle could effect each nation's strategic position in
the Middle East. Specifically, it is the vulnerability and proximity
of Iran to the Soviet Union and the potential escalation of Iranian
military and political dominance throughout the entire Gulf region
that are the two most pressing concerns of the U.s. Government. A
review of the facts just mentioned has been an underlying force behind
the White House/State Department attempting to maintain some relations
with these governments.
The U.S. has been involved with monitoring Iranian military action
for years through the forward naval forces stationed in the Persian
Gulf and through direct interaction with the Saudi Arabians. It has
provided the saudis with E-3A NilACS, early warning type aircraft, to
support them in monitoring the potential threat which Iran has
13
presented for a number of years. The chart of the entire Middle East
area in Figure 3 shows that the u.s. has geared its funding of major
security assistance programs in strategic locations around the Gulf
area. Most of these countries would not be used during an initial
surge phase into Iran, but would provide ideal staging centers for
resupplying a continued struggle.
The primary staging point that has been organized to support a
u.s. intervention anywhere in the Indian ocean region is the island of
Diego Garcia. After decades of a dominant British presence in the
Indian Ocean, in what was termed the 'British Indian ocean Territory
(BlOT) " the eventual decline of global power projection by this
nation has caused their withdrawal f rorn this area. The U.S., through
what has been called a 'vacuim theory takeover', has stepped in and
assumed the position previously held by the British (Adar, 1985).
Soviet presence in the Indian OCean area has grown SUbstantially
over the last 15 years as it has expanded the global role of its
Merchant Marine fleet. Sirnultaneously, the Soviets have also greatly
increased their military presence in this area. There are several key
factors that have driven the Soviets to expand their operations to
this region: 1) they maintain continual access to the Persian Gulf, 2)
forces on station can more closely monitor u.S. military operations,
3) their ASW forces can work to deter u.S. ballistic missile and
attack submarine operations, 4) they gain an important link between
their Black Sea and Pacific fleets and 5) they have developed
extensive fishing interests in the southern African area. To a great
extent, it is evident that superpower rivalry has hastened the
FIGURE 3
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Source: U.S. Department of Defense (1986), Fiscal Year
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report February)
14
15
strategic developments that are occurring in the Indian OCean.
The central staging location for U.S. military forces, Diego
Garcia, was officially leased to the U.S. in 1972 and a tremendous
amount of buildup and development of this atoll has occurred since
then. The island is occupied entirely by U.S. military personnel with
the exception of some Mauritian citizens who live on the island and
fill many support/labor positions. The natural inner lagoon,
apprOXimately 15 miles long and 4-8 miles wide, has navigational
depths of up to 45 feet and provides a safe haven for the Afloat
Prepositioning Force. Diego Garcia serves as a refueling port for
Indian Ocean forces with a storage capacity of 640,000 barrels of
fuel. In addition, the island provides facilities for food, parts
replenishment, communications, vessel repair and some recreational
needs for visiting ships.
The biggest problem faced with using Diego Garcia as a staging
point is the tremendously long supply legs that exist to the primary
interest points in the region and from logistic resupply points in the
Mediterranean and the Southwest Pacific theater. Diego Garcia is
located approximately 2700 NM from the Straits of Hormuz which
represents about seven steaming days for most logistic support
vessels. The normal operating range for most naval logistic vessels
is designed to be approximately 900 NM and it is evident that the
geography of the Indian Ocean, as presented in Figure 4,
createsspecial prOblems in this regard. From a resupply standpoint,
the distances to logistic stockpiles in Australia, the Philippines and
the Mediterranean create delays of up to two weeks or more. Should
FIGURE 4
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access routes, specifically the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombock
to the East and the Suez canal to the West, becane impassable, transit
distances to supply points can almost double.
The biggest advantage of the island is that it is under, and will
continue to be under, complete U.S. control and is not susceptible to
the political fluctuation that can be found in most of the Middle
East/North African countries. The heart of the prepositioning forces
has been designed with this island serving as a specific staging
point. This is not to say that relations with other countries have
been discontinued. Ongoing studies continue to be generated to
identify potential logistic resource points. From a regional
standpoint the following nations have port facilities, airports and/or
bunkering facilities that are of particular interest from a U.S.
military standpoint: Kenya, Kuwait, Djibouti, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Somalia and Pakistan. There have been active diplomatic and
financial ties with each of these nations in anticipation of using
their facilities in support of potential military operations.
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The stage has nON been set. It is assumed that Iran has gained a
strong foothold over the entire Gulf region following their victory
over Iraq. They intend to spread their daninance throughout the Gulf
and many pro-Western Arab nations are in jeopardy. The U.S., whose
Indian Ocean presence until this point has been primarily that of a
deterrent force, is nON prepared to conduct direct military operations
into Iran to confront this infiltration. The specific military
actions that the u.s. would use in conducting such an operation would
be designed around the specific Iranian military position. To
accanplish this analysis, the following areas are considered: 1) the
necessary logistic support measures that would be provided as the u.s.
begins to stage its forces for a initial shoreline strike, 2) the
development of shoreside supply points and 3) the progressive sealane
supply routes that would be established in support of a continued
struggle. The initial movement of forces into this area would be
supported by the first two phases of logistic action mentioned
earlier, those being prepositioning and surge.
From a sealift standpoint, the prepositioning program currently in
place has been designated the Afloat Preposi tioning Force (APF). This
force is composed of units of the original Near Term prepositioning
Force (NTPF) combined with the current composition of Maritime
19
Prepositioning Ships (MPS). The NTPF was created in 1980 for the
direct purpose of providing logistic pre-staging of equipment and
supplies in this unique and isolated frontier area while the formal
MPS fleet was being established. The primary group was stationed in
Diego Garcia with additional support from tanker units positioned in
Subic Bay, Philippines and an additional cargo prepositioned unit in
the Mediterranean. A total of seven ships in the primary group had
the capacity to supply an 11,000 man USMC brigade. The philosophy of
prepositioning, since the inception of the program, is that the U.S.
would be unable to conduct short notice military operations if a large
quantity of equipnent and supplies were not already in place in this
geographic area. This is especially true in the Indian Ocean where
great distances would preclude a rapid response without
prepositioning. The prepositioned material is mobile and is not
subject to land based politics which are very unstable in many nations
of this region.
The initial NrPF was composed of (4) Lighter Aboard Ships (LASH),
(1) Float-On/Float-off (FLO/FLO) vessel, (3) breakbulk freighters and
(4) tankers. When designing this type of a backup logistic force, a
worst case scenario is always considered. In this regard, having to
support operations on an essentially undeveloped beachfront would
cause prOblems with the discharge of prepositioned as well as follow-
on supplies. The purpose of the lASH and FLO/FLO type vessels is to
be able to carry equipment to the beach with little outside
assistance. The supplies are staged on their own platforms and need
only to be placed in the water and propelled ashore. There are
20
causeway ferries and waterjet propulsion assemblies that are carried
on the MPS vessels that have been developed for this express purpose.
The breakbulk vessels initially assigned to the NTPF do not carry
their own ship-to-shore equipment and must relay their supplies to
previously positioned ferries. The tankers in the NTPF were designed
to preposition large quantities of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL)
on station for use by other support vessels. What can be
distinguished already is that the original force was very piecemeal
and there was very little combination of logistic duties. If one
segment was prevented from accomplishing its duties, then the entire
plan was in jeopardy. The cost of operating this type of support
force is enormous. It runs about 15 to 35 percent of the value of the
cargo it carries and produces no revenues, thus in three to four years
operating costs exceed the value of equipment and supplies contained
onboard (Linville, 1984). Is it worth this price to have the
prepositioned material available? The commitment to the MPS
organization demonstrates that the answer to this question is, yes.
The logistic organization just discussed is aimed primarily at
providing this prepositioning for not just Navy, but also Army and Air
Force units involved in the conflict. The new concepts developed with
the creation of the MPS are designed to alleviate the specific
pitfalls mentioned and are geared almost entirely toward supporting a
landing of u.s. Marine Corps forces ashore.
This concept of USMC prepositioned forces is designed to support
the mission of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) concept. What was
originally a separate task force, is now incorporated as the primary
21
military tool to be utilized in Middle East operations as directed by
the U.S. Central Command. The essential goal of the RDF is to deter
and, if necessary, contain a conventional scale conflict anywhere in
the worLd, Coincidentally, the real lirnitations of such a force were
realized at the time the MPS concept was being developed. It was at
this time that the u.s. encountered extremely difficult logistic
prOblems in supporting the freeing of the hostages in Tehran. It
became very evident that the geography of the area is unique and
requires specialized support measures. The central group of MPS
vessels, Squadron Two, is stationed in Diego Garcia and it is evident
that their primary role is geared toward Middle East operations.
These vessels combine the aspects previously segmented in the NTPF
into a single platform. Each MPS squadron (four to five vessels) when
positioned in the Mediterranean, Pacific and the Indian Ocean is
designed to support a USMC amphibious brigade (approximately 16,500
men each) for up to a thirty day period (Rowden, 1985). To provide a
perspective on the overall capacity, the five MPS vessels carry the
equiValent of 1000 C-141 airlifts (Pettavino, 1986). Five MPS vessels
have been buil t fran the keel up for this purpose and eight have been
converted from other merchant platforms. Depending on the
construction used, these vessels are operated under 'Build and
Charter' or 'Convert and Charter' arrangements with a civilian
organization taking over actual operating responsibility of the vessel
(Rowsey, 1985). All of these vessels are under five year renewable
time charters and are manned by civilian crews entirely. The
operational tasking of these vessels still falls under the cognizance
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of the Navy I s fleet carananders.
These vessels have been designated T-AKX ships by the MSC and are
Roll-Gn/Roll-Qff (RO/RO) in design. They are designed to carry the
land vehicles, pre-containerized support equipment, fuel and water to
support troops in their initial assault. They are designed to perform
these tasks in an area where the shoreline is undeve.loped, They have
been given a 2S-year service life, and recent studies have shown that
these vessels and their pre-loaded cargoes hold up extremely well in
their prepositioned staging areas and suffer very little damage
(Sharkey,1984). Operating costs of these vessels are less than half
that to support the original NTPF and eventually all NTPF units will
be removed from the forward areas. At present, the primary role of
the MPS units is for the USMC. Additional units will have to be
structured and equ i pped for Army and Air Force use to allow for the
complete dissolvement of the NTPF. One major problan with the concept
is that these vessels provide necessary equipment and supplies, but
are not designed to carry the actual troops to the conflict area.
Advanced intelligence that is essential for the placement of
prepositioned material is just as critical for coordinating the
movement of Personnel to the designated staging locations. Troops
must be anplaced through either airlift or other waterborne vessels.
The contmued relations and support of many of the nations in the area
have been partially designed to allow for troop staging areas for
personnel that are airlifted great distances to support forward
operations.
A coordinated movanent of both rersonnel and their equipment to a
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designated mobilizing location is the key to success for the MPS
concept. There must first be a secured area provided for this effort.
The u.s. Navy's Amphibious Force is designed to provide this key
ingredient. USMC forces currently deployed are composed in what has
been tenned Marine Amphibious Ready Groups (MARG). A MARG is canposed
of a large number of USMC personnel that are carried within a complete
U.S. Navy amphibious ship group. Their purpose is to be able to
conduct a forward amphibious assault of a beachfront with minimal
outside support. Some land based equipment as well as fixed and
rotary wing aircraft are carried by the group for use in the assault.
The movement of a group such as this would be essential to allow for
the clearing of the beachfront area so that the unarmed MPS vessels
can be utilized. There is always a MARG on station in the
Mediterranean as well as in the Pacific, but there is no designated
MARG force assigned to the Indian ocean. The Mediterranean MARG is
geographically closer to the Persian Gulf, but the movement of such a
large group through the Suez Canal/Red Sea could be difficult
depending on the level of the particular conflict. There are fewer
choke points to be encountered fran the Pacific, but the distances to
be traveled are much greater.
Regardless of where the actual amphibious support force comes
from, the role of the MPS is essentially the same. The design of the
MPS has been structured to allow for the emplaC5nent of the necessary
equipnent to support a land based assault away fran the shoreline. The
ships themselves have undergone a tremendous design process and are
uniquely suited for this role. When fully established, the fleet of
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MPS vessels will triple the USMC supply capacity engineered into the
original NTPF force (General Dynamics Corp., 1985). Figure 5 provides
a detailed breakdown of exactly what capabilities have been
incorporated into the MPS design. Given a worst case scenario, an MPS
unit has the ability to use its CMI1 ROjRO capability in conjunction
wi th a ROjRO staging platform that is constructed alongside the ship.
There is a complete system of pontoons, causeways (both powered and
unpowered) and what are called Side Loadable Warping Tugs (SLWT) that
are used in assembling this platform. All components are designed to
be carried on the amphibious vessels of the MARG and will be on
station for use by the MPS vessels. Once constructed, this platform
greatly facilitates the staging of vehicles for movement ashore.
The vessel is also configured to carry POL products for use by
vehicles and aircraft ashore. The MPS vessel carries four miles of
flexible hose that it uses to discharge the 1.5 million gallons of
fuel held within its storage tanks to shore. In addition to the
ability to carry large quantities of fuel, the vessel also is
configured to carry refrigerated stores, dry stores and potable water.
Once the water supply is exhausted, the ship has the capability to
produce an additional 36, 000 gallons of potable water per day which
can also be piped to shore until shore distilling facilities can be
arranged. The causeway and ferry components discussed previously are
used to transport the rest of the equipment and supplies ashore after
the vehicles have been moved. The MPS vessel also carries its CMI1
LCM-8 work boats and pontoon causeway sections to supplement those
already in place and to serve as a backup system.
FIGURE 5
MPS VESSEL DFBIGN FEA'IURES
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SPECIAL MISSION
REQUIREMENTS
• ANCHOR OFFSHORE IN 5lf-KNOT W IND AND
3-KNOT CURRENT
• DISCHARGE CARGO WITH DECK CRANES IN
f>.F"T WAVES
• DISCHARGE AMPHIB IOUS CRAF"T OVER PARny
SUBMERGED STERN RAMP IN f>.FT WAVES
• PROVIDE LANDING CAPABILITY FOR CH-&:lE
HEliCOPTER
• TWO 18,000 GAL /DAY DISTILLING PLANTS
SUPPLY DRINKING WATER
• DISCHARGE UQUID CARGOES AT DISTANCES
UP TO 2 MILES
• " Y,'A R EHO US E" MIXED CARGOES FOR LONG
PERIODS
• CARGO DISCHARGE RATES
- AU VEHICLES AND 11-PERCENT or
REMAINING CARGO AT PIER IN 12 HOURS
- AU CARGO AT PIER IN J DAYS
- AU CARGO WHEN ANCHORED OFF·SHORE
IN 6 DAYS
SOurce: General Dynamics Corp.
MPS CARGO
VEHICLES
• ACCESS AND STORAGE FOR 1400 VEHICLIS
FROM JEEPS TO TANKS
• 150 ,000 SQ F"T (ABOUT FOUR ACRES OVER
SE VEN DECKSI
BREAK BULK CARGO
• 101,000 CU F"T FOR GENERAL CARGO
• 18,000 CU F"T FOR REFRIGERATED RATIONS
• zo.eoe CU F"T FOR AMMUNmON
PETIlOLEUM LUBRICANTS AND POTABLE WATER
• t.sss.eoo GAL AVIATION GAS, DIESEL FUEl,
GASOUNE IMOGAS)
• m DRUMS or KEROSENE AND LUBRICATING
otL
• 12,000 GAL POTABLE WATER
MISCELLANEOUS DECK CARGO
• TWO LCM" LANDING CRAF"T, TEN 21·F"T BY
~F"T UGHTERS 18 UNPOWERED, 4 POWEREDI,
1 SIDE LOADING WARPING rvc. 4 PIPE
TRAILERS , AND J HOSE REELS
(1985) Maritime Prepositioning
Ships, (unpublished advertising booklet)
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Several other factors need to be addressed to fully understand the
role these vessels will play should such a conflict emerge. The MPS
units are unarmed and require protection enroute to the conflict zone
as well as at anchor. In an Iranian conflict, the movement of these
ships from their prepositioned location in Diego Garcia would require
the escort of elements of the battle groups already on station in the
area. Once in the area of the Straits of Hormuz, an operational
decision would have to be made. The coastline of Iran is separated
into two distinct areas. One section is exposed to the Indian Ocean
directly and would allow for easier access and more continuous direct
support from the combatants on station. This would also allow for a
more direct approach by the initial MARG itself and would eliminate
many of the problems associated with transiting a narrow passage. The
amount of time necessary to fortify the beachhead to allow for
logistic development would be contingent on the power of the occupying
for ces in country. This coastal area also has the advantage of being
located near Pakistan. Our relations with that nation should allow us
the ability to use their country for the airlifting of troops and
additional supplies. The biggest drawback with an approach of this
type is the extensive land movement that would be required to move
forces to the dominant oil producing/refining areas as well as the
capitol to the northeast. Approximately 500 to 800 miles of desert and
mountains would have to be covered moving inland from the coastal
area.
The other coastal area of Iran and the largest of the two, is that
Which fronts the Persian Gulf from the Straits to Iraq. This area
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would provide the most direct and shortest access routes inland. The
biggest drawbacks of this approach are the necessity to transit the
straits safely and the protection that would be required to guard the
logistic elements once inside the Gulf. The Iranians have missile and
air assets which are designed to be used fairly close to their shores.
Recent news articles have also mentioned the development of Chinese
made surface missile emplacements along the Straits of Hormuz. The
carriers on station that would provide much of the air protection are
navigatiOnally prohibited from working in the Gulf and longer air
routes would be necessary to provide aircraft at the conflict site.
From strictly a waterborne logistic prospective, the initial
approach to the coastal areas that border the Indian OCean are more
advantageous from an access and protection standpoint. The status of
the actual conflict will drive the ultimate decision on which approach
to select.
A second major responsibility of the MSC during this initial phase
is the replenishment of the naval forces on station. This is
accomplished through the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) which is
currently the most visibly active sector of the MSC. The emphasis of
the mission of the NFAF is on providing fuel support to these
operating units. The inventory of the NFAF currently includes (11)
oilers, (1) stores, (1) ammo and (3) combatant stores vessels. These
units supplement the role of similar active duty replenishment vessels
of the Military Logistic Support Force (MLSF) which accompany battle
groups on station around the globe. The units of the NFAF are
distributed around the globe, yet they are continually used to support
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the replenishment of naval vessels whenever an opportuni.ty exists. A
good deal of advance intelligence is required not only to place MARG
and APF units in an area expeditiously, but also to collect the
available units of the NFAF on station. The basic role of the NFAF
vessels is to supplanent the MLSF vessels on station so that they can
be directed to resupply points. In this planning scheme, the NFAF
vessels are best utilized if they arrive on station as the MLSF units
in direct support begin to run low on fuel, stores and arrnno. Should
this timing not occur as planned, these vessels would be used to
replenish the short and long term resupply vessels which would begin
their movements toward the conflict area. The NFAF units already
designated are manned by Civil service Mariners (CIVMARs) with only a
small military detachment onboard to take care of basic communication
duties. The ships of the current NFAF are government owned and
current plans call for an augment of about 30 to 40 U.S.-flag
merchants to the force should a conflict begin to escalate. Other
units assigned to the NFAF, but which would not be used directly in a
conflict like this, are: towing/salvage ships, Fleet Ballistic Missile
Resupply ships and ocean surveillance vessels.
In summary, the initial phase of action is highly dependent on
advance intelligence to reduce the transit delays associated with
seaborne logistics. This is true for the initial assault mission of
the MARG, as well as the placement of vessels proximate to the
conflict area. The whole concept of prepositioning is dependent on
this advanced information. The safe transit of these prepositioned
platforms becomes the responsibility of the battle groups already
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stationed in the Indian OCean. The MPS vessels are the first logistic
assets on station in the scenario being presented and they represent
the key element for a successful military operation in this region.
The facilities designed into the MPS vessel provide a critical array
of supplies ranging from stores, to vehicles, to fuel. Because of the
multi-purpose design of the units, the loss of a single MPS vessel,
enroute to the conflict area, would not have as a dramatic an effect,
as would the loss of a particular single purpose vessel.
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The initial logistic support phases should occupy a time span of
about five to seven days. It takes at least that long to begin
activation of backup units and to reposition other military and
civilian units into the conflict region. Resupply occurs in two
phases, those being immediate or short term resupply (one week to two
months) and long term resupply (over two months).
As discussed in the introduction, resupply for as long as it is
necessary comes from certain predesignated areas. The first area is
predesignated overseas staging points and the second area is from war
reserve stocks in the u.s •• Both of these include ammunition, food,
equipment, parts and what has been termed strategic Oil Reserves. In
Figure 6, the sources for ship procurement to accomplish the resupply
mission are most likely to occur in the order shown.
The coordination that is necessary to locate and direct all of
these vessels is enormous. Realistically, it is the active duty naval
vessels and vessels of the MSC which provide most of the initial
logistics. By law, all vessels of the U.S.-flag fleet are subject to
allocation for military use and their primary role falls into the area
of resupply.
The communications network that has been designed to overcome many
of the initial coordination problems as well as long term tasking is
FIGURE 6
SHIP EMPLOY~1ENI' QiART
.
SHIP SOURCE PREPOSITIONEO SURGE RESUPPLY MLSF SUPPORT ATTRITION
MSC X X X X
U.S. FLAG X X
RRF X X X
EUSC X
NATOI ALLIES X
OTHER M)RF X
Source: u.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Strategic Sealift Division (1985) Strategic Sealift
Program Information, (unpublished report April 16)
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state of the art. U.S.-flag merchants, as well as ships of the Ready
Reserve Force, are currently being outfitted with the most modern
satellite and high frequency cammunications gear which are essential
if these ships are to be in direct communication with military routing
commands. There is also a plan to create what are termed Naval
Embarked Advisory Teams (NEAT) to be placed onboard merchant vessels
that have not been previously outfitted. This arrangement is
essentially a portable communications suite which can be installed on
any vessel and are operated by a Merchant Marine radio officer.
Depending on the disbursement of the vessels designated, the initial
transit legs to the operating and stockpile points may be quite
lengthy and involve considerable delay in placing these units in
active role.
The one system currently in place to overcome this initial time
delay,from a military standpoint, is the group of Fast Sealift Ships
(FSS) that have been added to the MSC inventory. There are currently
eight units in this group that were originally high speed SL-7
containerships which were purchased from Sea-Land Service, Inc. in
1981. These vessels have been procured for the MSC and have undergone
extensive redesign to convert them to RO/RO units. Their purpose in
the plan of logistic support is to provide the capability to lift
mechanized armor divisions for the U.S. Army. In support of the
mission of the Rapid Deployment Force concept, the potential need for
additional logistic support in a Middle East conflict was a primary
consideration in the development of this system. Some of the
breakbulk and standard containership features have been left in place
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to carry equipnent to supplement the armored divisions. The ships are
steam turbine powered and are capable of sustained transits of 33
knots. Fran a shipping standpoint, these vessels became prohibitively
expensive tCMard the late 1970s, but fran a military standpoint they
are valuable logistic assets. These units are designed to provide a
second wave of U.S. Army divisions to support the USMC brigades on
station and can be activated and begin their transit from the U.S.
within four days of mobilization. All of the FSS units are based in
the U.S., but with their advertised speed they can make a U.S. to
Europe transit in five days. They can then be in the Persian Gulf
area within another seven to nine days assuming a transit through the
Suez is uninterrupted. To put this in perspective, a similar transit
for the average merchant would take about 18 to 20 days.
There are two specific redesign features that have been
implemented in these FSS units that are also compatible for use in
many U.S. and Allied-flag vessels that may become used in a long term
resupply chain. The first of these is a concept known as SEA SHEDS
which are made up of 35' decks that can be installed in the holds of a
containership to carry various sized military cargo. As shCMn in
Figure 7, these racks have open tops and fold ~ay flooring that can
be arranged one over another to facilitate loading and unloading. on
the FSS units, extra crane capacity has been added to the main deck to
give these ships the self-sustained loading/unloading capacity that
may be necessary at an undeveloped resupply depot point. The SEA
SHEDS are rated to carry 100 tons of equipnent each. Due to their
design, they do not have to be completely removed from the vessel at
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FIGURE 7
SEA SHED DESIGN
I
1III111 II
1U1====;ll![I:l!~~::r;i;I1
SEA SHEDS STACI(ED IN CONTAINERSHIP HOLD
Source: U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Strategic Sealift Division (1985) Strategic Sealift
Program Information, (unpublished report April 16)
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the discharge point. 'Ibis particular feature, whether installed on an
FSS unit or as part of any c<mnercial containership, allows the vessel
to proceed on with very little configuration change. The FSS units
specifically are fitted with eight of these units. A total of 200 SEA
SHEDS are planned for construction to support this growing area of
logistic development.
The second concept that has been developed is the use of FLATRAO<S
to carry oversized cargo. Although the rated capacity of these
features is only 60 tons maximum, their design allows these same FSS
units or other ccmmercial vessels the ability to carry unique military
cargo. Examples of cargo that can be carried with this design are the
M-l tank and some fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. As shown in
Figure 8, these racks have an open top and open sides and they must be
ccmpletely removed as the cargo is discharged. Once unloaded they can
be stored easily for future use or reloaded onto the ship and carried
back to the original stockpiling points to be reused. Each FSS will
have the ability to carry 78 of these FLATRACKS. A total of 7000
FLATRAO<S have been planned for delivery by 1990.
These two features which have been incorporated for use with FSS
vessels, have to a great extent, been planned for use primarily for
coomercial containership reconfiguration. The goal of the MSC is to
have enough of both SEA SHED and FLATRACK units to supply 50
containerships (U.S. Department of Defense, 1986). By law the
initial allocation of U.S.-flag units has already been designated
through what has been called the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP).
Ships that have received construction subsidies and ships receiving
FIGURE 8
FLATRACK DESIGN
Source: U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
strategic Sealift Division (1985) Strategic Sealift
Program Information, (unpublished report April 16)
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operating subsidies are automatically enrolled in this program. In
addition, any u.s. company that carries DOD cargo must comrndt at least
50 percent of their U.S.-flag vessels to this program. The fact that
any U.S.-flag vessel can be commandeered, if necessary, for military
use can be misleading since specific support commitments must be
analyzed. Although there are a large number of U.S.-flag units,
unless special modifications are provided only a limited number of
them have military operational advantages. The specific SRP
incorporated by the MSC has specified which vessels hold the primary
capabilities that can be of use to military resupply efforts. The
Roll-On/Roll-Off and barge carrying vessels are considered the most
useful from a military viewpoint (Pettavino, 1986). The primary
advantages of a system such as this are the formation of a pre-planned
arrangement for vessel allocation and that the ships designated are
crewed entirely by U.S. personnel.
The next sources of ships to be utilized in the scenario are the
Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet (EUSC) vessels and the ships of our
NATO Allies. These pools are extremely large, but at the same time
there are some major problems with their use. The term EUSC refers to
those merchant vessels who have at least 50% U.S. business ownership
and who fly the flags of Liberia, Panama, Honduras and the Bahamas.
Vessels flying these flags of convenience have been specifically
chosen because their governments have no active legislation forbidding
U.S. procurement of the vessels. In a global conflict, the U.S. would
probably allocate EUSC vessels no matter what flag they fly, but in a
conflict such as is being analyzed that may not be quite as easy.
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Vessels which may be used in this role are covered by War Risk
Insurance provided by MARAn. Of the approximately 400 vessels in this
category, there are only about 80 that have any appreciable military
usefulness. The biggest problem to be faced, other than diplomatic
repercussions, is that the crews are primarily foreign. Because of
this there must be a planned restructuring of the crew so that the
ship can be sent into a hostile area. This same problem must be faced
when examining a potential pool of NATO ships that may be available.
Some of these units are designated for military use already so that a
joint agreement between nations for their use with their crews would
probably be the easiest alternative. The total number of NATO ships
in this pool is about 600 and most of these have some military
usefulness. The actual conflict being supported would have to be
fairly lengthy (six months +) and in some way directly involve the
interests of a particular NATO country before ships in this pool would
be utilized. From an organizational standpoint, the requisitioning of
both Euse and NATO vessels would be an extremely lengthy process in
terms of locating the actual units, reconfiguring them in terms of
carrying capacity and crew makeup, placing them under logistic caronand
control and, finally, delivering them to the conflict area with their
cargoes. For the purpose of this study, this pool is not utilized.
As the conflict progresses, there is another large backup reserve
force that has been formulated to provide resupply capacity. That
force is part of our National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) and is
deSignated as the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). There are currently 73
ships (63 cargo and 8 tankers) in this mothball fleet inventory with a
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programmed increase in this fleet bringing the number to 119 ships by
1991. Vessels in this category are mostly older breakbulk ships with
additional groups of RO/RO, tanker, LASH and other specialized
carriers. These vessels have all been obtained from commercial
shipping corporations by purchase agreements created by the Maritime
Administration (MARAn) who has been given cognizance in this area.
Each ship in the inventory has been placed in a five, ten and twenty
day readiness status. This sliding scale of activation dates is
designed to allow the smooth transition of these ships from their
storage points into active service with a pre-planned specialized
grouping of vessels designated for each activation phase. The vessels
are currently at three locations, those being: James River, Va.,
Suisun Bay, ca. and Beaumont, Tx.. The initial mission of the RRF is
to support military actions in Europe and the Pacific. A conflict in
the Middle East/Indian Ocean would greatly add to the time delay in
placing these units on station in an active role. Many of these RRF
vessels are in the age category of 15 to 20 years and older and are
not capable of high speed transits. Another consideration currently
being examined is that there is no concrete organization in place to
establish the crews for these vessels. Both MARAn and the Merchant
Marine Associations maintain files of personnel who have the
background and training to man vessels of this nature, but a
structured crew arrangement has not been pre-established. The vessels
themselves are maintained in their respective readiness levels at a
cost of about $1 million dollars/vessel/year with funds provided by
the u.S. Navy and administered by MARAD. From a logistic standpoint,
40
taking vessels from their storage points and transiting them through a
process to an active level will be extremely lengthy.
Another factor is that most of these vessels were not designed to
work in remote areas with an undeveloped unloading system. To
overcome this particular difficulty, twelve auxiliary crane ships are
being added to the current RRF inventory. These specialized vessels
have been refitted with several heavylift cranes and could transit to
an area and be tied up alongside vessels that lack their own unloading
equi.pnent , This particular plan is especially helpful in an area such
as the Persian Gulf. One of the eleven vessels will actually be
placed in service in the Indian Ocean area to support potential
logistic operations and the rest of the vessels will be phased into a
five day RRF readiness level. Two of the units of the RRF will serve
as training platforms for Navy and Arm¥ personnel who will be placed
on station in logistic support roles should a conflict occur. The
training for these personnel will be conducted in the area of
loading/discharging standard cargo loads as well as the SEA SHED and
FLATRACK configurations. This entire plan will be in place by the end
of PYa8.
The last category of resupply units that may be utilized will be
the remaining vessels of the NDRF which will replace vessels that are
attrited through actual conflict or mechanical problems. The vessels
in this category, which number about 140, are primarily the World War
II Victory type breakbulk vessels that are still in mothball. Once
again, the conflict that would have to emerge to justify the
activation of these vessels must be global in nature. Since the
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advertised activation times for these vessels is a minimum of 30 to 60
days, they will most likely not be used in the interdiction being
analyzed. Under current planning, all of these vintage vessels will
be scrapped in the early 1990s.
It would be unfair to analyze short and long range resupply
through just the vessels themselves. Current technology has created
several systems that can be utilized in easing the flow of cargo, both
in liquid and dry form, ashore in an undeveloped area. 'I11ese systems
have been constructed to be carried to a conflict area after the
initial phases to ease the transport of cargo ashore. 'I11e one system
that has been chosen to move liquid cargo ashore is a commercial, off-
the-shelf apparatus that has been procured by the MSC. This system,
known as the Offshore roL Discharge System, is shown in Figure 9. The
piping system used can carry roL from a distance of 4 miles offshore
to bunkers established on land. With the initial arrangement setup,
approximately 1.2 million gallons of POL can be moved in a 20 hour
period. This initial system, which takes about 48 hours to set up, is
similar to that described for the MPS vessels and is essentially
piping and a temporary mooring for the vessel. This temporary
arrangement is used until the Single Anchor Leg Mooring (SALM) is
installed. The installation process for the SALM takes about another
seven days, but once in place it can handle continuous pumping in much
higher sea states. There are also systems designed for dry cargo that
are similar to the powered causeways. These will be used in
conjunction with more advanced temporary pier structures that are
established at the beach. These systems will be utilized to ease the
FIGURE 9
sncrz ANCEOR LEG IDORING (SALM) DESIGN
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SOUrce: U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Strategic Sealift Division (1985) Strategic Sealift
Program Information, (unpublished report April 16)
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flow of equipment and supplies ashore, but set up will not occur until
the actual conflict has most likely moved inland.
Another plan to support long term resupply is the augmentation of
commercial vessels with underway replenishment (UNREP) gear that can
be used with the associated naval units on station. While the task of
UNREP is conducted primarily by the naval auxiliary ships and MSC
vessels, there has been a program developed to equip and train
commercial vessels for this task. This program includes UNREP gear
installation for both fuel and dry store transfer. This entire
concept is incorporated into a sealift enhancement process which has
been designated Civil Reserve Auxiliary Fleet Ships (CRAFrS). Within
this program, privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels are
designated for this purpose and are to be outfitted with the UNREP
gear. At the present time, only units of the MSC and RRF are actually
undergoing the physical installation process. The U.S. Navy pays for
the installation of these features either as a modification to
existing ships or asa supplemental feature added to new construction.
U.S.-flag ships that have not been directly fitted do have rigs
designated for their use which are now in government storage. The
process for installation has been designed to be quick and once
installed the Navy will pay to maintain these rigs for 15 years.
This overall concept of sealift enhancement encompasses many of
the logistic features which have been addressed. The SEA SHED,
,
FLATRACK and communication upgrades have all been included in this
program. other programs in planning include the modification of LASH
vessels to carry extra causeways for beachhead development, siderail
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and maindeck modifications so that vessels can carry extra lighters
and specialized container strike-up systems to facilitate the
loading/unloading of container vessels which have been used for
military cargo.
Two other support concepts that are noteworthy are the hospital
ships and the aviation logistic support vessels. Two commercial
tankers have been converted to forward deployable, acute care medical
facilities. Each vessel has twelve operating roams and a 1000 bed
capacity. They will be manned entirely by civilian personnel. One
unit will be based on the West Coast for use in the Pacific and the
other will be located on the East Coast for Atlantic tasking. Each
hospital ship has an activation timeframe of five days. The second
concept, that of an aviation support unit, was developed to provide
repair facilities at the conflict area for all types of aircraft.
These vessels have been pre-planned to carry repair parts as well as
an array of elaborate technical and machinery repair equipment. Two
Seabridge class commercial vessels have been procured and converted
for this concept. They will be placed in a five day RRF readiness
status upon completion.
In summary, this resupply phase has been composed of structured
programs of logistic support, each with a specific timeframe for
utilization and a designated purpose. In a conflict, such as the one
being analyzed, resupply will be primarily conducted with active MSC,
U.S.-flag and RRF vessels. Unless the particular situation escalates
out of the Gulf region, the assets available from our NATO and other
foreign allies are not necessary. The initial surge and
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prepositioning plans for this geographic region are firmly
established. This does not seem to be the case when examining
resupply measures. 'Itle initial logistic tools have been prelocated
and their plans for employment automatically occur when operational
commanders initiate the strike, while the resupply lines and available
assets are generally widespread and less defined. Nothing except the
normal resupply for operating forces stationed in this ocean has ever
been tested. There appears to be more problems associated with long,
rather than Short term resupply. This is due to the coordination and
staffing of commercial and reserve units that would be necessary.
Much has already been written on the decline of our Merchant Marine
force. Many experts believe that we have reached a point where it
would be impossible to support resupply without the aid of other
nations.
'Itle development of our RRF seems to be the key in solving this
particular situation. Some of the RRF units should be stored in
African and Asian ports to facilitate their activation for use in this
region. Granted, there are some potential security and protection
problems associated with this idea, but there also could be two
advantages. First, using other nations to help maintain the upkeep
will provide same money into a country's economy as well as to help
foster good relations from a military and diplomatic standpoint.
This type of program could be included in the security assistance
programs already in existence. second, the placement of units into
this region will reduce the extremely long activation delays that will
accompany the st.at i orunq of designated RRF vessels into the conflict
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area. It will be a lot easier to airlift a crew to the region than it
will be to wait for the ship to complete its transit from the u.s..
If only a limited number of ships are involved in this program, then
it may be advantageous to station a peDmanent crew aboard the vessel
in its overseas location. This is similar to what is already being
done on the MPS vessels.
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There are two major purposes in writing this paper. The first is
to give the reader an introduction into the concept of strategic
Sealift and the second is to highlight the specific tools and
philosophies that are available today, to attain the goals of the
concept.
Chapter One introduces the concept of logistics and presents that
idea tram a military prospective. History has demonstrated over and
over again, that with a strong logistics force, the favorable outcome
of any military operation is enhanced. This was most recently
demonstrated in the British victory in the Falklands campaign. The
understanding of the integral role of three major concepts is vital
when military logistic plans are formulated. These areas are:
airlift, sealift and prepositioning. This paper deals primarily with
sealift and prepositioning and discusses the role of those ideas
within the overall Strategic Sealift concept. This idea is presented
through a simulated (yet potentially real) military interdiction of
U.S. forces against Iran. The two specific hypotheses that are tested
are: 1) That we do in fact, have the necessary logistic tools to
support a military conflict in the Persian Gulf and 2) That we have
analyzed the unique external variables that this geographic region
presents and that we have the ability to overcome them.
- ------- ----- - -
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and are comprised of the original Near Term Prepositioning Force (pool
of single purpose vessels) and the newly acquired Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (mUlti-purpose logistic vessels). The primary
mission of this force is to supply the vehicles, equipment, stores,
fuel and water for a 16,500 man USMC brigade which would be the
initial ground force landed in the COnflict area. This concept as it
has been developed for the Middle East is the heart of the Rapid
Deployment Force strategy, originally devised in 1979. The function
of the logistic force, as well as that of the combat forces, is
addressed in this section.
The next chapter describes the short term (one week to two months)
and the long term (over two months) resupply assets that would be
vital to sustaining military forces on station. The broad array of
available resupply assets includes: 1) those owned and hired directly
for MSC use, 2) U.S.-flag Merchant Marine vessels, 3) the Ready
Reserve Force, 4) the Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet, 5) NATO assets
and 6) other vessels in the National Defense Reserve Fleet inventory.
Each of these assets could playa vital role in resupply to the Middle
East and each is evaluated as to its potential in the scenario given.
In this situation, the units of the MSC, the Ready Reserve Force and
U.S.-flag vessels would provide the majority of the resupply
functions. There would have to be a more global escalation of the
conflict to involve the aquisition of the other assets. The current
ability of the assets is considered, as is the Sealift Enhancement
Program, which will upgrade both military and non-rrdlitary vessels for
use in actual combat support roles.
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In retrospect, the answer to the first hypothesis stated in the
introduction should lead the reader to an easy conclusion, yes. From
a sealift standpoint, the u.s. by far holds the greatest array of
military logistic assets on the face of the earth. History has
demonstrated that this type of logistic support power is an essential
element in global power projection. The Indian Ocean, and
specifically the Persian Gulf, is a unique area of the world which
poses special conditions that must be faced by u.s. forces involved in
military operations there. The ability to overcome these special
conditions was the foundation principal behind the creation of the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Many of the physical assets previously
discussed were formulated to support just such a special mission.
From a hardware and technology standpoint, the U.S. should feel secure
that it has the physical tools and personnel to accomplish the bottom
line goal of the RDF, which is the rapid insertion of troops to deter
and halt opposing force aggression.
Has the u.s. then properly considered the rest of the variables
which may corne into play in such a situation as has been discussed?
The three factors which are addressed most frequently in studies about
just such a conflict are: the sustainability of resupply lines halfway
around the world, free access to the region and the protection that
needs to be afforded the logistic assets. In many ways, a limited
conflict in the Persian Gulf would be similar to that encountered in
supporting sealift to South Vietnam. The area into which equipment
and supplies are being sent is a great distance from U.S. shores and
the opposing forces have a limited capability to disrupt the sea lines
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intervention occur, thi s same type of support can be structured in
spite of the decline sUffered by the Merchant Marine. Our
conventional forces on station in the Indian ocean and the Persian
Gulf can easily protect our logistic assets from an Iranian attack.
The military assets of Iran are closely monitored and even though arms
shipments are being provided by both the u.s. and the Soviets, the
Iranians are not being provided with excessive firepower.
The mission of the RDF is to act quickly to deter and halt
aggression. If that is the objective in a Persian Gulf operation,
then definitely yes, the u.S. does have both the tools and the ability
to overcome the external variables which could undermine success.
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